Review of \u3ci\u3ePatrick Connor\u27s War: The 1865 Powder River
Indian Expedition\u3c/i\u3e by David E. Wagner by Monnett, John H.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Great Plains Quarterly Great Plains Studies, Center for
Spring 2011
Review of Patrick Connor's War: The 1865 Powder
River Indian Expedition by David E. Wagner
John H. Monnett
Metropolitan State College of Denver
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly
Part of the American Studies Commons, Cultural History Commons, and the United States
History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Monnett, John H., "Review of Patrick Connor's War: The 1865 Powder River Indian Expedition by David E. Wagner" (2011). Great Plains
Quarterly. 2668.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/2668
164 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 2011 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patrick Connor's War: The 1865 Powder River 
Indian Expedition. By David E. Wagner. Norman, 
OK: Arthur H. Clark Co., 2010. 296 pp. Maps, 
illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. 
$39.95. 
Patrick Connor's War is the late David E. 
Wagner's second book in the past year dealing 
with the military operations against Lakotas 
and Cheyennes in the Powder River country 
of today's Wyoming and environs in 1865. Like 
his previous work, Powder River Odyssey, deal-
ing with Nelson Cole's wing of an expensive 
army offensive operation against the Plains 
tribes in the wake, some contend, of raids on 
the Overland Trail avenging the Sand Creek 
Massacre, the current book relies heavily on 
campaign records, personal recollections, and 
diaries of the officers, civilian contractors, 
and enlisted men involved in the campaign. 
The volume is rich in detail and likely the 
most complete composite synthesis of these 
campaign records kept largely by men of state 
volunteer regiments. The book includes many 
maps that are easy to follow once one real-
izes the campaign traveled up and down river 
and stream courses rather than along modern 
roads. 
The Connor campaign was basically a logis-
tical disaster in country largely tierra incognita 
to the U.S. Army. Food was often scarce; by 
late fall the army had lost hundreds of horses 
to storms and cold, and many soldiers were on 
foot. Those corn-fed army horses that remained 
were near starvation by September and never 
had been a match for the swift grass-fed Indian 
ponies. Occasionally the soldiers had to trade 
for provisions with the very Indians they were 
fighting. The columns did inflict casualties on 
an Arapaho village in September near modern 
Ranchester, Wyoming. Some sources contend 
these particular Arapahos were living with 
peaceful intent, although some of them may 
have participated in prior raids. 
The campaign cost millions of dollars, gen-
erally was a failure in subduing the Lakotas and 
Cheyennes, and reached the level of a scandal 
in Washington among Democrats. The offen-
sive actually served to embolden the Plains 
Indians' beliefs that they were invulnerable 
and, by using their harsh homeland environ-
ment to their advantage, could withstand any 
and all invasions of the Powder River country 
in the future. Essentially, Connor was fight-
ing long-range logistical and communication 
problems in the days before railroads, along 
with the harsh, dry, storm-prone topography 
of the Northern Plains, more than he was the 
Indians. 
Although Wagner offers conclusions regard-
ing the failure of the Connor expedition, the 
book could have been strengthened through 
an analysis of the political results as well as 
the logistical. By 1866, with the Civil War 
ended, volunteer units were being mustered 
out of service, leaving a much reduced regu-
lar army more concerned with administering 
the military Reconstruction districts in the 
southern states than having a large presence 
on the western frontier. Congress put the nix 
on any more large offensive campaigns on the 
Northern Plains until the next decade. As a 
result, the military presence in the Powder 
River country in the next few years was scanty, 
operated sporadically from new permanent 
forts, and further emboldened the Lakotas 
and Cheyennes during Red Cloud's War 
(1866-1868) and Hancock's War (1867). The 
upshot was the Treaty of 1868 and the Treaties 
of Medicine Lodge, which had far-reaching 
effects on Indian policy and Indian nations as 
the Federal government attempted to win in 
peace through these treaties what it could not 
win in war. The result of that, of course, was 
the so-called Great Sioux War of 1876-1877. 
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Although Wagner's treatise suffers from 
the lack of Indian perspectives and little use 
of Indian sources, for military buffs the book 
does serve as a good day-by-day journalistic 
narrative of the movements and operations of 
the army side of the campaign following the 
conclusion of the Civil War. 
JOHN H. MONNETT 
Department of History 
Metropolitan State College of Denver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
